lorimt: (Default)
lorimt ([personal profile] lorimt) wrote2003-10-21 06:54 pm

Random Philosophy

I juts ran across this while reading Avicenna.

"Moreover, if any thing is composed of two things, if one of the two things cam be found without the other, the other can be found without the first. An example of this is oxymel, which is composed of vinegar and honey: if vinegar can be found without honey, honey can be found without vinegar. Another example is the formed statue composed of bronze and the human form: if bronze can be found without the human form, the human form can be found without the bronze. This can be found by induction and has many examples."

I'm not buying into the induction bit without an actual proof, since I've seen too many 'proofs' of this sort by ancient philosophers. The concept, however, strikes me as very interesting, particularly the form/material bit. Does anyone have any counterexamples, or particularly interesting examples? My brain is wavering between "I've got it, it all makes sense, look how obvious this idea is," and "What about this case? This isn't true at all."

Of all the Avicenna I've worked through tonight, this was the bit that most caught my eye. It sort of sums up the rest however. I've found a tendency to alternate between "how interesting," and "you make no sense," though usually in regards to different arguments.

[identity profile] theojf.livejournal.com 2003-10-21 11:56 pm (UTC)(link)
I also thought of quarks, although I might have arrived at them from slightly differently...

I don't quite understand the statement, though. If any thing is composed of two things, if one of the two things can be found without the other, the other can be found without the first. I find it hard to imagine defining "thing" without allowing it to "be found without the other". And so if it is "composed of two things", I would immediately assume that those things can each exist without the other. Else what justifies them being called "things"? But then quarks can't exist independantly, so I came to the same conclusion: maybe they don't deserve to exist. Or maybe they just shouldn't be called "things". 'Cause I guess there are lots of objects which have as part of their definition their relation to something else, so they shouldn't exist without other stuff.

E.g. I claim that part of the definition of "Theo" is my relation to society. In particular, that I am a social being. And I don't think I would exist without society. However, society can exist without me. So am I a "thing"? I guess. So maybe things can be such that they require other things to exist. I dunno.

[identity profile] easwaran.livejournal.com 2003-10-22 12:18 am (UTC)(link)
If you mean that "you" wouldn't exist at all without society, or in a different society, and you still want to postulate this idea of yourself as an existent object, then you're contradicting Avicenna. However, just because you always require a context, even if it might be different contexts, that doesn't mean that you don't exist independently of any particular context.

[identity profile] squirrelloid.livejournal.com 2003-10-22 09:04 am (UTC)(link)
I will note that quarks don't qualify, because while they cannot exist without each other, this implies that you can't find one without the other (a requirement of the statement to be true), its just the second part has to only occur with the first.